Japan nuclear crisis response
was confused and blighted by poor communication
Japan Nuclear Crises
EMF Computer Protection
Magnetic Field Detector
26 Dec 2011
The response to Japan's nuclear crisis triggered by the
March 11 earthquake and tsunami was confused and blighted by
a failure to communicate, according to a new report.
The 507-page interim report is based on interviews with more
than 450 people directly involved in efforts to get the
crippled Fukushima Daiichi plant under control after it was
struck by the 32-foot-high tsunami.
The report highlights that fact that Tokyo Electric Power
Co., the operator of the plant, the Nuclear Industrial and
Safety Agency and the
even failed to appreciate the scale of any potential
disaster as the plant was only designed to withstand a
tsunami of 20 feet.
The initial crisis was exacerbated when staff mishandled the
emergency cooling system in the No. 3 reactor and were
unable to comprehend the status of the cooling system in the
No. 1 reactor.
The report pointedly criticised the operators for using the
term "outside our imagination" for the events of March 11 in
an effort to avoid responsibility. By describing the crisis
as beyond what might have been considered possible, the
company had brought public distrust on itself and the
The report found that staff on duty at the plant were not
trained to handle a power failure, such as was caused when
the tsunami destroyed backup generators.
There were no systematic procedures to follow and staff at
the plant failed to communicate with colleagues at the site,
their headquarters and the government.
Workers also failed to realise that coolant water to the
reactors had been disrupted, despite warning indicators that
the nuclear cores were melting down.
The government also came in for strong criticism for failing
to release information to the public and for using "evasive"
language to avoid confirming that the reactors had melted
Failure to disclose data also meant that people living close
to the plant were exposed to radiation instead of being
report is scheduled to be completed next summer and will
highlight a host of other failures – from insufficient
batteries for mobile phones within the plant to confusion in
the government because two teams set up to handle the crisis
in Tokyo were not communicating.